Behavioral Network Science and the Democratic Primary Game

Behavioral Network Science and the Democratic Primary Game

Networked Games: Coloring, Consensus and Voting Prof. Michael Kearns Networked Life MKSE 112 Fall 2012 Experimental Agenda

Human-subject experiments at the intersection of CS, economics, sociology, network science Subjects simultaneously participate in groups of ~ 36 people Subjects sit at networked workstations Each subject controls some simple property of a single vertex in some underlying network Subjects have only local views of the activity: state of their own and neighboring vertices Subjects have (real) financial incentive to solve their piece of a collective (global) task Simple example: graph coloring (social differentiation) Across many experiments, have deliberately varied network structure and task/game

choose a color for your vertex from fixed set paid iff your color differs from all neighbors when time expires max welfare solutions = proper colorings networks: inspired by models from network science (small worlds, preferential attachment, etc.) tasks: chosen for diversity (cooperative vs. competitive) and (centralized) computational difficulty Goals: structure/tasks performance/behavior individual & collective modeling prediction

computational and equilibrium theories Experiments to Date Graph Coloring Consensus player controls: choice of one of two colors payoffs: only under global agreement; different players

prefer different colors max welfare states: all red and all blue centralized computation: trivial Networked Bargaining player controls: limit orders offering to exchange goods payoffs: proportional to the amount of the other good obtained max welfare states: market clearing equilibrium centralized computation: at the limit of tractability (LP used as a subroutine) Biased Voting

player controls: decision to be a King or a Pawn; variant with King side payments allowed payoffs: $1/minute for Solo King; $0.50/minute for Pawn; 0 for Conflicted King; continuous accumulation max welfare states: maximum independent sets centralized computation: hard even if approximations are allowed Exchange Economy player controls: color of vertex from 9 choices payoffs: $2 if same color as all neighbors, else 0 max welfare states: global consensus of color centralized computation: trivial Independent Set

player controls: color of vertex; number of choices = chromatic number payoffs: $2 if different color from all neighbors, else 0 max welfare states: optimal colorings centralized computation: hard even if approximations are allowed player controls: offers on each edge to split a cash amount; may have hidden deal limits and transaction costs payoffs: on each edge, a bargaining game --- payoffs only if agreement max welfare states: all deals/edges closed centralized computation: nontrivial, possibly difficult Voting with Network Formation player controls: edge purchases and choice of one of two colors payoffs: only under global agreement; different players prefer different colors max welfare states: ??? centralized computation: ???

Coloring and Consensus first neighborhood view [demo] Small Worlds Family Simple Cycle Leader Cycle 5-Chord Cycle

20-Chord Cycle Preferential Attachment, Preferential Attachment, =2 = 3 Art by Consensus Sample Findings

Generally strong collective performance Systematic effects of structure on performance and behavior: natural heuristics can give reverse order of difficulty Providing more global views of activity:

rewiring harms coloring performance in clique chain family rewiring helps consensus performance in clique chain family Preferential attachment much harder than small worlds for coloring nearly all problems globally solved in a couple minutes or less helps coloring performance in small world family harms coloring performance in preferential attachment

Coloring problems solved more rapidly than consensus easier to get people to disagree than agree Biased Voting in Networks Biased Voting in Networks Cosmetically similar to consensus, with a crucial strategic difference Deliberately introduce a tension between: individual preferences desire for collective unity Only two color choices; challenge comes from competing incentives If everyone converges to same color, everyone gets some payoff But different players have different preferences

each player has payoffs for their preferred and non-preferred color e.g. $1.50 red/$0.50 blue vs. $0.50 red/$1.50 blue can have symmetric and asymmetric payoffs High-level experimental design: choice of network structures arrangement of types (red/blue prefs) & strengths of incentives most interesting to coordinate network structure and types Minority Power: Preferential Attachment Summary of Findings 55/81 experiments reached global consensus in 1 minute allowed mean of successful ~ 44s

Effects of network structure: Cohesion harder than Minority Power: 31/54 Cohesion, 24/27 Minority Power all 24 successful Minority Powers converge to minority preference! Cohesion P.A. (20/27) easier than Cohesion E-R overall, P.A. easier than E-R (contrast w/coloring) within Cohesion, increased inter-group communication helps some notable exceptions

Effects of incentives: asymmetric beats weak symmetric beats strong symmetric the value of extremists value Effects of Personality fraction < value Behavioral Modeling model: play color c with probability ~ payoff(c) x fraction in neighborhood playing c

Lessons Learned, 2005-2011 At least for n=36, human subjects remarkably good diverse set of collective tasks diverse set of network topologies efficiency ~ 90% across all tasks/topologies Network structure matters; interaction with task contrast with emphasis on topology alone Importance of subject variability and style/personality Most recently: endogenized creation of the network network formation games challenging computationally (best response) and analytically Edge Purchases: Strategic Tensions

Buy edges or not? For information or influence? Early in the game or late? To high degree or low degree players? Nearby or far away? Experimental Design Session A: 99 experiments 63 unseeded with varying payoffs, imbalances, asymmetries 36 seeded with Minority Power settings

Session B: 72 experiments mixture of unseeded and variety of seeded (cliques, torus) A: 47/99 solved (47%): 25/63 unseeded, MP 22/36 B: 27/72 solved (38%) Session C: 72 experiments final networks from hard settings in Session A permitted 0 or 1 edge purchases per player started with both initial and final incentives from Session A C: 25/72 (35%); All: 99/243 (41%) Subjects seem to build difficult networks! [tape]

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